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if Mr. Franklin had been found contributorily negligent, he would
have been barred from recovery just as were the plaintiffs in Seelbach,
Inc. v. Mellman8" and Tate v. Canary Cottage.40 Nor is there any reason
to believe that Blue Grass Restaurant in any way overruled Brown
Hotel in which the accident causing the injury was held not to have
been within the contemplation of the ordinance violated. Rather, it
must be said that the Court in Blue Grass Restaurant merely followed
existing Kentucky law as applied to its facts. Any criticism must be
directed at the unfortunate choice of words used in the one-sentence
holding, which, if taken out of context from the rest of the opinion,
would seem to imply that absolute liability was imposed.
William S. Cooper
WOcXMN'S COMPENSATIoN-"AisiG OuT OF" REQUImEMENT-OPER-
ANG PM Ms.s.-Plaintiff was employed in a hospital and covered by
the Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Act. She fell and was injured
one morning while walking toward the hospital from the hospital
parking lot where she had parked her car. The Workmen's Compensa-
tion Board denied her claim for compensation and plaintiff appealed to
the Harlan County Circuit Court. The decision was reversed by the
Circuit Court and the Board appealed to the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals. Held: Affirmed. The parking lot was a part of the employer's
operating premises and the injury was therefore compensable. Harlan
Appalachian Regional Hospital v. Taylor, 424 S.W.2d 580 (Ky. 1968).
Kentucky's Workmen's Compensation Act requires that a com-
pensable injury arise "out of and in the course of ... [the employee's]
employment."' (Emphasis added) The development of this dual re-
quirement, as interpreted by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, has
followed a definite pattern.
The initial arise "out of' requirement has historically been linked
with causation and has been the primary test. In fact the second re-
quirement of arising "in the course of his employment" was often
dependent upon the first.2 In parking lot situations similar to that in
39 293 Ky. 790, 170 S.W.2d 18 (1948).
40 802 Ky. 813, 194 S.W.2d 663 (1946).
IKY. REv. STAT. [hereinafter cited as KRS] § 842.005(1) (1962).2 1n considering the principle behind the exceptions to the premises rule,
Larson says "in this instance, as in many others, the concept of 'course of employ-
ment' follows that of 'arising out of employment'; that is, the employment-con-
nected risk is first recognized, and then a course-of-employment theory must be
devised to permit compensation for that obviously occupational risk." 1 LARsoN,
WQaMN'S CONwEVNSATON LAW [hereinafter cited as LARsoN] § 15.15 (1965).
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Taylor, the Court has handed down two decisions, both dealing pri-
marily with causation.3 In United States Steel v. Isbell,4 a miner slipped
on ice and snow before he reached the bathhouse on his way to the
mine. Following the Harlan-Wallins Coal CorpY decision of the same
day, the Court denied compensation, ruling that it was not shown that
the injuries suffered by the employee had a causative connection with
the employment. Compensation was again denied in Bickell v. Ford
Motor Co.6 in 1963 where the claimant fell on ice in the parking lot
furnished by the employer. The Court found that the injury did not
arise out of his employment since "The accident and resulting injury
were not incident to the hazards of Bickell's employment." The re-
quirement of a causation linkage between the injury and the hazards
of the employment was not to continue to be a bar in parking lot
situations.8
In 1965 the Kentucky Court of Appeals adopted the positional risk
doctrine in Corken v. Corken Steel Products, Inc.9 without stating
restrictions on its use. The question was whether the Court would
3There is one other significant parking lot decision in which an employee
leaving work fell and broke his leg in his employer's parking lot. But the employee
had felt ill during the day, and compensation was allowed since it was 'shown
with reasonable certainty that his dizziness or blindness resulted from the nature
of the work and formed a part of the train of causation of his accidentally falling
and breaking his leg .. " A.C. Lawrence Leather Co. v. Barnhill, 249 Ky. 437, 61
S.W.2d 1, 4 (1933).
4275 S.W.2d 917 (Ky. 1955).
5 Harlan-Wallins Coal Corp. v. Stewart, 275 S.W.2d 912 (Ky. 1955).6370 S.W.2d 193 (Ky. 1963).
7Id.
8 This requirement was generally applied in "going and coming" rule cases.
The control of the employer over the trip, the surrounding environment, and
particularly the damaging instrumentality appears to have uniformly determined
the arising "out of" issue and, therefore, compensation. For example, where an
employee picked up a live wire on the employer's premises on his way from the
bathhouse to the mine and was electrocuted, the Court allowed compensation.
Harlan Gas Coal Co. v. Trial, 213 Ky. 226, 280 S.W. 954 (1926). But where the
employee was injured on his way home in a non-employee's truck, due to a
faulty steering gear, on a road maintained by the employer, compensation was
denied by the Court; See Harlan Collieries Co. v. Shell, 239 S.W.2d 923 (Ky.
1951).
9 385 S.W.2d 949 (Ky. 1964). Larson defines the "positional risk" doctrine
as follows:
An injury arises out of the employment if it would not have occurred
but for the fact that the conditions and obligations of the employment
placed claimant in the position where he was injured. . . . This theory
supports compensation . . . in cases of stray bullets, roving lunatics,
and other situations in which the only connection of the employment with
the injury is that its obligations placed the employee in the particular
place at the particular time when he was injured by some neutral
force .... 1 LARSON § 10.00.
See Note, Kentucky Adopts the Positional Risk Doctrine: Chance for a New Ap-
proach, 55 Ky L.J. 172 (1966).
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expand this decision to include "neutral" risks'0 and even beyond to
personal risks, a position not taken by many jurisdictions." The 1965
decision was not clear on the matter. In 196512 and 196613 the Court
further added to the confusion in citing the Corken case but not
using the positional risk theory.14 The potentially sweeping doctrine
was still unapplied outside the typical positional risk situation.
If the Court has adopted the positional risk doctrine in at least all
neutral risk cases, this rather generous determination has reduced the
causation connecticn of the injuries with the industrial risks of the
employment to a factor of very little consequence. This would leave
the "out of" requirement a low hurdle for claimants which could
quickly be passed over to the "course of" requirement.' 5
Traditionally, under the "course of" requirement, an employee was
not compensated for injuries suffered while going to or coming
from work.'8 Well-recognized was the "premises" exception, allowing
compensation while the employee was on the premises of the em-
ployer, within reasonable and subjective limits of time.' 7 The Kentucky
Court of Appeals refused to allow compensation to be governed by
the boundary line of the employer, and the employer's premises were
carefully distinguished from his property.' 8 But the premises exception
was not an absolute rule. Occasionally the Court established an "ex-
ception to the premises exception" where a reason was found to ex-
tend the premises line of the employer to include something not
legally a part of the premises.19 Conversely, the Court sometimes failed
to apply the premises exception, as in Draper v. Railway Accessories
Co.20 wherein the Court denied compensation to a railroad employee
10 Neutral risks are defined by Larson as those risks neither clearly personal
to the employee nor peculiar to the employment. 1 LAnsoN § 7.30.
11 See 1 LARsoN § 6.40.
12 Black v. Tichenor, 896 S.W.2d 794 (Ky. 1965).
13 Gordon v. Jefferson County Fiscal Ct., 403 S.W.2d 278 (Ky. 1966).
14 For a discussion of the position of the law after Black and Gordon, see
Workmen's Compensation, 1967 Court of Appeals Review, 55 Ky. L.J. 492 (1967).
: 5 In Barker v. Eblen Coal Co., 276 S.W.2d 448 (Ky. 1955), the Kentucky
Court stated the rule for premises cases: "in order to be compensable the
accident must have some relation to an industrial hazard." 276 S.W.2d 448, 449
(Ky. 1955). See 8 Scmmron, WoRnvrN's COmPENSATION TEXT [hereinafter
cited as ScHnEwmEa] § 1719 (1951).16 See 8 ScnNErmE § 1710; Draper v. Railway Assessories Co., 300 Ky. 597,
189 S.W.2d 934 (1945).
17 1 LARSON § 15.11. Kentucky has not accepted the premises exception as a
positive rule, but rather has narrowed it. See 1 LARsoN § 15.42.18 Ratliff v. Epling, 401 S.W.2d 43, 44 (Ky. 1966).
19Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd. v. Riddle, 301 Ky. 100, 190
S.W.2d 1009 (1945). (allowing compensation to night custodian of airport, struck
by car while crossing public highway adjacent to airport before work, since he
inspected the warning lights on poles before the accident.)
20 800 Ky. 597, 189 S.W.2d 034 (1945).
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although he was injured on the premises on his way home.
The Court reactivated the premises extender in Ratliff v. Epling.21
In this case, a miner, while waiting for his ride after work, decided to
pick up some wood for his personal use. An embankment on the
employer's premises caved in and he was killed. The Board denied
compensation and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Here was an em-
ployee who had left the actual working premises of his employer, had
lingered on the general property of the employer after hours for
personal reasons, and was injured in a manner foreign to the tasks at
work and the risks they involved. The problem was that he still was
on the employer's premises. The Court took a new view of the term
"premises" to allow an escape from the liability limitation of the going
and coming rule. Where the injury did not occur on the "operating
premises" of the employer, compensation would be denied.22 "In our
opinion the 'operating premises' test is a fair one and most consistent
with the trend of our decisions, and we hereby adopt it."23 Operating
premises became the new exception to the going and coming rule-
a decision in keeping with previous holdings refusing to make
compensability guidelines congruent with boundary lines.
The effect of the Taylor decision was to elaborate on the extent of
the operating premises line. The Court dealt exclusively with the
question of whether the employee was in the course of her employment
at the time of the injury. Emphasis was placed on the necessity of
hospitals having parking lots for personnel. The holding was modeled
after a decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,24 the originator
of the "operating premises" test. The Pennsylvania Court had held that
"the parking lot was clearly an integral part of the hospital premises."25
Under this theory, the Kentucky Court held that the parking lot
qualified as part of the operating premises of the hospital within the
rule. Its extension to the hospital parking lot was a carefully narrow
holding, not generally applicable to parlking lots furnished by em-
ployers.26 Note the wording by the Pennsylvania Court, as quoted by
21401 S.W.2d 43 (Ky. 1966).
22 Id. at 43, 44. The Kentucky Court took the concept from decisions by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. A short survey of the operating premises rule as
maintained in Pennsylvania is found in 1 LARSON § 15.42.
23401 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Ky. 1966). In that decision, an additional issue of
deviation from the course of the employment denied compensation to the claimant
although he was said to have been on the operating premises of the employer.
24 Shaffer v. Somerset Community Hosp., 205 Pa. Super. 419, 211 A.2d 49
(1965).
2519 d. at -, 211 A.2d at 49, 50.
26Although the language in Taylor leads us to narrowly construe the holding,
it should be noted that the Court overruled four cases including the two afore-
mentioned parking lot eases rather than distinguishing them, leaving the way
(Continued on next vaee)
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the Kentucky Court of Appeals, in a case where compensation was
denied:
In the present case it is obvious that the parking lot was not a part
of the operating business; it was distinct therefrom and separated from
defendant's plant by a public throughfare . . . .Neither physically nor
constructively was the parking lot part of the premises upon which the
employer's business was conducted, and in which the claimant was en-
gaged. If claimant's theory is sound, any such parking lot, regardless of
its remoteness to an employer's plant, would have to be considered as
part of the premises upon which the employer's business was carried on.
The word "premises" cannot be enlarged in its meaning and application
so as to include land or property outside of that used in connection with
the actual premises where the employer carries on the business in which
the employee is engaged.27
The operating premises theory is best applied to field enterprises
where the employment is not confined to a building or structure.28 In
the plant or factory, the operating premises are within the plant,
possibly extending outside of the loading dock or delivery entrance a
matter of feet. This holding does not seem to affect the non-inclusion
of parking lots as operating premises in those situations.29 However, as
the premises exception to the exclusionary going and coming rule ex-
pands, this holding may be more widely construed.
Equally important is what the decision did not consider. The
decisive issue in the two similar situations earlier before the Court 0
was the lack of a causative link between the injury and an industrial
risk of the employment. In the Taylor decision, the arising "out of"
issue was never discussed.al The issue should not have been over-
looked. If the employee is being employed to walk from his bench
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
open for futher extension of the rationale to include other parking lots. Indeed,
if the key of the decision was the necessity of a hospital having a parking lot, is
it any less necessary for any other business to have one, where its employees must
drive to work?
27Young v. Hamilton Watch Co., 158 Pa.Super. 448, 45 A.2d 261, 263
(1946).28 This is the type of situation in which the operating premisses theory was
adopted. The problems of "premises in coal mining situations have troubled the
Kentucky Court for many years. See Note, Workmen's Compensation-The "Going
and Coming" Rule and its Exceptions in Kentucky, 47 Ky. L.J. 420 (1959).
29 It is difficult to beieve that, if this holding is enlarged to include other
"necessary" parking lots, the distinction between adjacent and non-adjacent parking
lots across a street, as recognized by the Pennsylvania decisions and quoted by the
Kentucky Court, will continue to stand as the dividing line for operating premises.
20 United States Steel v. Isbell, 275 S.W.2d 917 (Ky. 1955); Bickell v. Ford
Motor Co., 370 S.W.2d 193 (Ky. 1963).
31 Was this an application of the positional risk doctrine as adopted in
Corken v. Corken Steel Prods., Inc., 385 S.W.2d 949 (Ky. 1964)? Or did
Ratliff v. Epling, 401 S.W.2d 43 (Ky. 1966), obviate the consideration? It should
not be overlooked that in basic workmen's compensation theory such a parking
lot situation often raised only the determinative "course of' issue. 8 ScENEMDEM,
§ 1719. Note the following discussion in Ratliff: (Continued on nex t page)
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to the loading dock and falls on ice at the dock, then he will be
compensated. But in Taylor the Court extends compensation to a new
area for Kentucky; the former bar to compensation in these cases
should not be quickly passed over. Falling on ice is the kind of mishap
that would be expected to occur when workers are engaged in un-
loading trucks on icy docks. But a hospital laboratory technician is
hardly expected to encounter this difficulty in the performance of her
duties. Viewed independently through common meaning, the risk of
falling on ice in the parking lot is clearly a personal one and not one
to be placed on the product or service.32
However, an injury on the operating premises from a hole in the
pavement, from an accident with an ambulance, or from an accident
in delivery of goods to the hospital is incident to the normal hospital
routine and might properly be compensated. It is asserted that the
causation linkage requirement found in the two earlier cases ex-
pressed a needed consideration beyond the "course of" issue. Note
Larson's workable explanation of the exception to the premises ex-
ception:
[W]hen a court has satisfied itself that there is a distinct "arising out
of' or causal connection between the conditions under which the claimant
must approach and leave the premises and the occurance of the injury,
it may hold that the course of employment extends as far as those
conditions extend.33
It is evident that much of this rationale as expressed in earlier
Kentucky decisions has been overruled by the Court in recent years. 34
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
The theory of some of those cases was that the accident was not covered,
even though occuring on the employer's premises, because the employee
was not exposed to an "industrial hazard." Since our cases have not
uniformly used this criterion (which is a rather elusive one at best),
and since eminent authorities do not consider it relevant, we no longer
think it should be controlling. Ratliff v. Epling, 401 S.W.2d 43, 44
(Ky. 1966).
32 "The ultimate social philosophy behind compensation liability is belief in
the wisdom . . . of allocating the burden of these payments to the most ap-
propriate source of payment, the consumer of the product." 1 LARSON § 2.20.
33 1 LARSON § 15.15.
34 See Harlan Collieries Co. v. Shell, 239 S.W.2d 923, 927 (Ky. 1953).
Further, this former intent was a part of the rationale of another decision over-
ruled in Taylor:
A majority of the members of the Court are still of the opinion that the
Shell case presents a sounder approach to the question than would
result from its consideration in terms of time, or place, or both ...
Furthermore, we think it is for the Legislature and not the courts to
determine the policy of whether the Comprensation Law, KRS § 342.001
et. seq, should cover workers when going to and from work on the
premises of their employers. Hrian-Wallins Coal Corp. v. Stewart,
275 S.W.2d 912, 913-14 (Ky. 1955).
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The full effect of the adoption of the positional risk and operating
premises doctrines awaits further illumination by the Court of Appeals.
It is clear that the new look which the Court is giving KRS 842.005(1)
requirements of arising "out of and in the course of his employment"
will result in allowing more comprehensive coverage.
Glen S. Bagby
ARREST PRocEIDuE: BiGHT TO USE FORCE TO ARREST DURING A BRoT
A riot is the earlier sowing of bitterness and confusion by political op-
portunists and racial hate mongers, goody goody fakes, Negro and white,
coupling themselves tragically with the public apathy that marks off
this whole generation to anybody's needs.1
Kentucky's first racial violence occured in Louisville, beginning on
the evening of May 27, 1968.2 The rioting continued for several days
and was accompanied by vandalism, looting and burning. Several of
Louisville's ghetto residents were injured, many by policemen's
bullets. This tragedy reached its climax when two teenage Negro
boys were killed-one by a storeowner and the other by a blast from
I Sermon by the Rev. W. Carter Merbreier, Shattered Toys in Black and
White on the Philadelphia Riots, Summer, 1964 as cited by Leary, The Role of
the Police in Riotous Demonstrations, 40 NomRE DAME LAw 499, 501 (1965).21t started one evening when 350 young ghetto residents came to a rally
to see and listen to Stokely Carmichael. Circulars had been distributed to the
ghetto residents stating that Carmichael would be the featured speaker at a rally
called to demand the dismissal of a Louisville patrolman. Actually, the circulars
were a come-on to attract a crowd. Members of the Black Unity League of
Kentucky who organized the rally knew that Carmichael would not appear. At the
rally, a rumor was started by James Cortez, a self-proclaimed volunteer worker
for the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, who climbed upon the top
of his car and said, "I am Stokely's right hand-man. Stokely wanted to be here,
but another honky [white man] trick is keeping Stokely out of Louisville." By
this time, twenty-five teenagers were perched atop buildings in the area to ob-
serve the rally. After several speeches, part of the crowd chanted, "Black power,
black power, black is beautiful." After more speeches which were drowned out
by shouts, it happened. A soft drink bottle was tossed from the top of a building.
Store windows were broken. Police cars rushed to the scene. Several of the cars
were struck with rocks and bottles as officers emerged from them with gunsdrawn. "Man, when I saw those guns, it was all over," a fifteen year old said.
"That's when I started throwing." A few minutes later, a band of about twenty
youths went after an empty police captain's car. They rocked it back and forth
in almost joyous fashion until it finally turned over; later it was set afire. By now,
the atmosphere was festive, almost carnival-like. Two taxicabs were overturned
and set afire in the minutes that followed. "Oh baby, it's finally here. It's really
happening," several youths were heard to say as the rioting spread from the inter-
section. The Courier-journal & Times, June 16, 1968, § A, 8, cols. 1, 2, 3,4, 5, 6.
(emphasis added.)
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